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Rhetoric and Somatics:
Training the Body to do the Work of Law
Peter Goodrich
In a passage of the Lawiers Logike that is ostensibly concerned with
the rhetorical figures of description, Abraham Fraunce surprisingly
defines "chronographia," the description of time, by reference to
its antithesis. Citing "Master Lambard", Fraunce gives the following
example: "an arrest is a certain restraint of a man's person, depriving
it of his own will and liberty, and binding it to become obedient to
the will of the law; and it may be called the beginning of
imprisonment." 1 (1588a: 64r) Stasis or arrestation of the body is
here used ironically to exemplify interruption of the essentially
incorporeal passage of time. Spatial confinement is used to signify
a certain displacement or self-consciousness of temporality.
Similarly inverting the usual order of disciplines, Fraunce uses law
to exemplify rhetoric: a legal definition is used to illustrate what
Renaissance rhetoricians variously term a "sensable figure"
(Puttenham 1589: 136, 148) or "figure of amplification." (Peacham
1593: R iv b) In Fraunce's own Ramist lexicon, the figure of
description is termed "an imperfect definition" and, again using a
legal example of the general category of figure or scheme, he cites
the maxim "the common law is common use." (Fraunce 1588a: 64)
While there is a certain critical radicalism to Fraunce's
Renaissance inversion of the disciplines, his subjection of law to
rhetoric, I wish here to elaborate a more unusual and contemporary
reading of the figure of corporeal imprisonment that is used to
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illustrate the indefinable quality of temporality. In Lambard's
definition, imprisonment implicitly renders the body docile and so
amenable to instruction (docere) or inscription of law. The body is
both the site and the conduit of submission of the soul to the
"will of the law": arrest deprives the person of will so as to replace
it, to bind it, to the meaning and form of law. While in one sense
the superimposition of a collective intentionality upon the itinerant
form of the person is unexceptional, there is also a more complex
play of person and will, body and soul that deserves expansion.
The law is staged through the body, and it is through corporeality,
through the characteristics and qualities of the body and its
movements, that the most profound substrates of law are to be
read: "the body of the Law is a human body; the substance to be
counted, that which signifies, is not some eternal principle but rather
the embodied subject, a physical presence... [for] everyone comes
to dance with the Law." (Legendre 1997: 37)
There is, of course, an obvious sense in which forensic rhetoric
played a part in the juridical inscription and fixation of the body.
Under the rubric of elocution the rhetorical handbooks stipulated
norms of gesture, dress and deportment, as well as of the
appropriate degrees of physical expression of passion, from
blushing to tears, from murmurs to the vocal modulations of rage.
In the same vein, the rhetoric of memory required training of the
body to receive the imprint of texts and events. The figures of
discourse themselves can also, in this regard, be understood as
signs of emotions (Goodrich 1995: 181), of the excitations of the
body, which compose what Elias coined as the "invisible wall of
affects" that constitute the psyche. (Elias, 1978: xii) It is in this
sense that the body is prisoner of the soul (Foucault 1977: 30) and
that through the long term training of the body, psyche and person
come to take on their social form. To submit the person to the
"will of the law" is thus a double arrestation, it confines the body
so as to constrain the symbolic subject, that real yet non-corporeal
body which is variously named psyche, consciousness, subjectivity
or soul.
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Training the body to do the work of law is thus a much broader
problematic than that of simple interpretation and observance of
the positive norms of legislation and judicial decree. Just as the
body as the object of law is an intermediary surface, the site of an
economy of knowledges, investments, and powers, so too "the
law" m~st be understood recursively as the site of a complex of
disciplines and strategies. Law is in this sense itself an effect of
knowledges and practices that are strictly speaking extrinsic to it.
Legal dogmatics, in this respect, is an unconscious discipline: not
only is law bound explicitly to the repetition of prior determinations,
to the invocation of an indefinite past-inveterate usage, custom,
habit, mores-as the structuring principle of present applications,
but in a stronger sense the "micro-physics" ·or infinite particularity
of law applying acts both give effect to and endeavour in turn to
effectuate an institution of life, a constitution and manners, civility
and justice that far exceed the bounds or knowledges of law. 2
The specific disciplinary transgression of strict legality to be
addressed in this essay through the work of Abraham Fraunce and
selected contemporaries, is that of rhetoric and the decorum, the
affections and relationships, eloquence and intimacies it implies.
Read in the context of the ascendancy of Ramist dialectics and the
submission of all the disciplines to the rule of method, there is a
subtle and as yet unremarked subversion at work in Fraunce's
critique of law from the perspective of what is in effect a rhetorical
reason. Fraunce in his turn arrests law and submits it to the will of
the exterior norms of rhetoric as well as the scholastic rule of
methodical reason. More than that, however, the rhetorical critique
of law subjects the discipline or doctrinal discourse of legality to
the reassertion of the form of life, the fantasmatic structure or
imagination, that rhetoric ideally implies. It is in this respect that
Fraunce is most radical and it is here that Fraunce's critique starts,
with the economy of the disciplinary body, and with its corporeal
manifestations.
It is no accident that it is the pretended isolation of lawyers,
and particularly the legal hostility to scholarship, that is blamed for
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the failings of law: "you would love the law, but sine rivalr. you
would reign, but alone: hinc illae lachrymae." (Fraunce 1588a: 3v)
That the jealousy or insularity of law should be made manifest by
tears, by physical insignia, should also be understood epistemically.
Law marks the body and effects its strategies of governance through
the inscription of emotions: through boredom, fear,
embarrassment, love and the historical signs of attachment or
denial. The lawyer cannot do other than inhabit the domain of the
senses, that of the bodies that are subject to law in the manner of
subjects, and in recognising this substrate of the logic of law,
Fraunce enters immediately a tradition of rhetoric in which
eloquence is the arbiter of both justice and love, in which the poem
is the essential practice of amorous relationship, and law is at best
a figure of poetic expression and of the rhetorical judgement that
it inspires. (Goodrich 2001)

Of the causes of the corruption of eloquence
To read the Lawiers Logike as a critique of law based in rhetoric and
poetics as much as in logic itself is to read the work somewhat
against the grain. Two observations can perhaps facilitate such a
reading. The first is that the Lawiers Logike is to be understood
within the corpus of Fraunce's work and indeed is only formally
comprehensible if understood as, amongst other things, the sibling
of his poetry and as the other face of the Arcadian Rhetorike. (1588b)
For Fraunce, as for the ancient orators, "it is the poets, writers of
imagination, who still maintain the stock of natural logic that
scholasticism's falsehoods have perverted." (Dzialo, 1998: 9)
Rhetoric, in consequence, must necessarily and explicitly suffuse
the method of law because it is the discipline that most directly
reads the imagination and so offers access to the proper learning
of law, the knowledge of things divine and human, the combination
of spiritual and temporal, of body and soul. 3
The second and more expansive consideration is that of the
tradition of rhetorical critique of law to which the Lawiers Logike
244
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belongs. There is, of course, a certain common ground that
associates Fraunce most closely with the reforming impetus of
Ramism and specifically with the English reception of that neoscholastic movement. (Howells 1956: 249-255, Ong 1958, Vickers
1988) As is well known, Fraunce studied under the English Ramist
Gabriel Harvey and while at Cambridge attended the lectures that
were published as Ciceronianus. (1577, 1945) Amongst the many
virtues of Harvey's treatise is a critical distance from authority,
worship of the ancients or any of the erstwhile "Gods of latinity."
(1945: 69) In the spirit of cisalpine humanism counterposed to
classicist antiquarianism, Harvey counselled a scholarship that
transcended disciplinary boundaries, and a rhetoric that looked
beyond the surface of discourse, the words or body of the text, to
the varied knowledges that it entailed: "in studying Cicero the
imitators ought to study not only his latinity but his resources of
wisdom and factual knowledge." (1945: 73)
Fraunce's sweeping critique of legal method clearly draws upon
Harvey's urbane interpretations of Cicero and Ramism, but he
also draws upon a more specifically juridical post-Ciceronian
tradition of controversiae and of resistance to the peculiarly legal
forms of the corruption of eloquence. In reconstructing this
tradition as running from Cicero's Pro Archia poeta oratio (1923 ed),
through Quintilian's lost work De causis corruptae eloquentiae (Brink
1989), to Tacitus' Dialogus de oratoribus, (1914 ed) I wish to make
explicit both the interdependence of poetics and law, and the
epistemic distinction of poetry as the form through which it is
possible to know and judge law by criteria that both exist in and
address a beyond of law. The court that judges the legitimacy of
legality was not historically the Kantian court of reason but rather
the court of rhetoric and its laws of love.
The theme is implicit in Pro Archia and deserves a brief initial
interrogation. Cicero's defence of the poet and of poetry begins
with an assertion of the "common bond of a mutual relationship"
that binds together all the arts and addresses the shared theme of
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how best to live. (Cicero 1923: i. 2) Already, in other words, the
orator addresses law in terms of a poetically accessible beyond of
law, a domain which is later depicted in terms of friendship, of the
spirit and the senses. It is through literature and poetry that the
forensic orator finds inspiration, purpose and the pleasure that
accompanies "having never failed my friends." (vi. 13-14) In the
face of the clamour and wrangling of law, "the name of the poet is
holy." (viii. 18) It is through poetry that law gains its meaning, its
inviolability: "if the soul (animus) were haunted by no presage of
futurity, if the scope of her imaginings were circumscribed by the
spatial limitations-the measures-of human existence" then
neither law nor lawyer would have any reason to labour, suffer,
lose sleep, or otherwise struggle for life itself. (xi. 29) Poetry was
thus the vehicle of loyalty and the primary medium of friendship.
Law was but an instrument through which the poetic designs of
love could find an impermanent protection or expression.
The rhetorical submission of law to the designs of friendship
and the dictates of imagination or more properly fate, are themes
that frequently return in the Ciceronian tradition. In jurisprudential
argot these are the figures of the natural law tradition which, in
good Platonic form, bind the shadowy domain of positive law to
the role of reflecting a prior law, that of nature, of the first Venus
or love. (Goodrich 1997; 2001) For the Ciceronian orator, legality
is bound to obey an imagination or vision embedded in atheistically
given nature and encoded in laws of amity and love that gain their
proper expression in poetry, in lyric and literature, rather than in
the dead prose-Bacon's litera mortua--of law. (Bacon 1630: A 2 a)
Law itself, in this tradition, was but mutus magistratus and could only
come to life through rhetoric, through speech. It is this concept of
law, this hermeneutic structure which addresses law as being the
reflection or image of another poetry or cause, that finds expression
in Quintilian and in Tacitus ip the specific form of an attack upon
the ineloquence or corruption of the forensic schools of rhetoric,
and so also of the letters of the law.
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In that the text of the De causis has been lost, our only access
to the work is through the Institutio oratoria. (Quintilian 1996 edn)
That is perhaps reason enough to divagate briefly into the definition
of rhetoric that the latter work provides. The definition of rhetoric
as bene dicendi scientia, comes in the course of a lengthy discussion in
book two of the Institutes. (II.xv. 34, 38) Reviewing that definition,
in the course of an excavation of the meanings of casuistry,
Legendre comments insightfully on the philology of the phrase
and concludes that "the work (opus) of interpretation is
accomplished through the labour of the actor (artifex)," the artist
who devotes her time to the cause of speaking well, to bona oratio
or just speech. "Casuistry is thus to be understood as the art of
speaking justly. Whether oral or written, discourse must be just."
(Legendre 1992: 384) It is the legal orator whom Quintilian
addresses in this definition, and that the advocate speaks well means
that he speaks justly, that is according to the definitions, norms
and doctrines that constitute the justice (iustitia) from which law
derives its name (ius).
Following in the Ciceronian tradition, Quintilian's desire to
equate eloquence with justice also implies a rhetorical judgement
of law: insofar as human law is just, it is so because it has found a
language that approximates more or less accurately and so more or
less eloquently to the unwritten reason or ghostly inscriptions of
nature herself Positive law should in these terms endeavour ideally
to reflect the inchoate language, the images or primary words of
the spirit that was their origin or cause. The best language, to borrow
from Sir John Fortescue, was a pristine language, one that had
been spared being "altered and depraved by common use"
(Fortescue 1460, 1737 edn: 108), and hence was a language that
was just to the extent that it rendered the justice it transcribed in
the language of its original expression. Whatever the precise
conception of nature or god that motivated the hierarchy of laws,
the hermeneutic significance of the definition is resident in the
formulation of a rhetoric that is bound to read law in terms of a
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justice that exceeds it. For Quintilian and for Tacitus, rhetoric
addressed and judged law by reference to a domain of spirit, animus
and ethos, that transgressed strict legality and so also the habitual
bounds or litera mortua of juristic expression.
The interrelation of justice and eloquence can be given further
illustration by looking in detail at the discursive context and the
specific form in which the definition of rhetoric is given. Book
two of the Institutio is concerned most broadly with the education
of the young orator, with the exercises, instructions and narratives
through which the "young boy" can be brought to appreciate the
dependence of rhetoric upon truth (veritas) or, in Ciceronian terms,
the real. To appreciate the proper forms of legal argument thus
not only requires that youth be inculcated with a sense of the real,
but also that the corporeal reality of puerility-the exuberance,
ardour, imaginative excess, poetic licence and luxuriance of the
young-be acknowledged. Thus the teacher of rhetoric is a nurse
to the student, feeding milk to the mind and attending to the plump
body (plenus corpus) of the juvenile orator. The virtues of rhetoric
are inculcated early and the soul is trained not least by corporeal
routines and the other finely grained interventions into attitude,
expression and emotion. What is noteworthy for a contemporary
analysis of the epistemology of legal rhetoric is the persistence of
the corporeal referent of knowledge and speech.
Even in the work of a conservative such as Quintilian, poetry
is placed in advance of law and the licence, imaginings, and other
excitations and drives generated by the poetic sustain the early
training of the legal mind. (1996 edn: Bk. II. iv. 2-8) The virtues as
well as the motives for speech are alike grounded in the poetic, in
the fire or the passion that is aroused most strongly in the youthful
orator. When it comes to the specific depictions of just speech,
the same corporeal object domain of action, of the real as truth, is
again intrinsic to the proper demarcation of just and unjust speech.
If justice in practice means speaking justly, the definition of justice
also necessarily implies a practice or domain of oratorical acts. It is
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for this reason that Quintilian foreshadows his exegesis of the
meanings of rhetoric by examining the institutions and practices
of legal oratory. How, he asks, did the ancients exercise their
"powers of speaking" (facultatem dicendi exercuerunl), what were the
objects, directions, qualities and tones of their rhetorical acts? (Bk
II. iv. 33-41) The answer to that question again lies in the subtle
education of the juristic soul.
Before arriving at the ideals of eloquence and justice it is
necessary to observe the salutary images of ineloquence and
injustice. The insertion of training in legal rhetoric in the domain
of practice lodges the legal firmly in history, in the temporal,
corporeal and failing world of events. The truth of that world is
that injustice and the cacozelia or pernicious words through which it
is known are more common than acts of genuine felicity or just
measure. To understand the eloquence of justice, it is necessary
first to appreciate the theory of declamation and attend to the
corruptions of speech to which, historically, it has given rise.
Declamation, the dialectical method of scholastic argument for
and against a particular point of fact or law, was the principal means
of training in the controversiae of legal rhetoric. The educational
virtue of declamation lay in its imitation of the real, in the fidelity
of its representation of the practice of lawyers and courts. In the
present day, however, Quintilian observes, declamation has
"degenerated to such an extent. .. that it has become one of the
chief causes of the corruption of modern oratory." The rhetorical
roots of this corruption lie in "the extravagance and ignorance"
(licentia atque inscita) of our declaimers who, abandoning all
semblance of the real-simillimae veritatis-or any actual
declamation, debate the doings of magicians, plagues and oracles,
the fantastical cruelty of stepmothers and other unreal things. (Bk.
II. ix. 5-6)
The detachment of speech from the real is not only an epistemic
failing, a rant or lunacy, but is also depicted as a physical defect.
The ignorant and engorged declaimer is like a cow that has blown
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itself out with a surfeit of green food and just as the cow has to be
cured by blood-letting, so the declaimer "should be rid of his
superfluous fat and his corrupt humours must be discharged." (Bk
II. x. 6-8) In a later passage from Book V, the theme of the "swollen
emptiness" of the declaimer is revisited in sexualised corporeal
terms: "declaimers are guilty of exactly the same offence as slavedealers who castrate boys in order to increase the attractions of
their beauty," to which is added the thesis that "[a] false resemblance
to the female sex may in itself delight lust, if it will, but depravity
of morals will never... succeed in giving real value to that which it
has succeeded in giving a high price." (Bk V. xiii. 18, 19-20)
Desexualisation through mutilation is here made the equivalent of
injustice in the realm of speech: empty oratory is an injustice that
equiparates with the most extreme violence against the order of
nature and specifically against the sexuality that defines corporeality.
Just as the soul is inscribed through the training of the body,
through the institutional and everyday routines that give the body
affect and speech, so too the body-its attitudes, tones, deportment
and dress-is in turn the expression of the qualities of the soul.
Justice in these terms refers to far more than law, and the justice of
speech to which legal oratory is gauged or directed has
correspondingly to be understood according to a much finer series
of juridical nuances than is usually acknowledged either in rhetoric
or law. In Pauline terms, speech is the spirit, it is the soul in the
body, it is breath and it is life. While the soul may in Christian
terms have priority over the body, it is only known through, or
accessible by means of the body. In the same vein, the body is in
classical terms an image, a mode of transport between words and
things, a site of passage that exists according to the various
chimerical temporalities of memory and hope. 4
For Quintilian, the corruption of speech is the sign of injustice,
of the degeneration of body and soul, of violence and anti-nature.
Put differently or simply in a positive formulation, one aspect of
legal rhetoric is that of maintaining, both at the level of education
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and of practice, the criteria and values, the attitudes and relations
upon which just speech depends. It is these political and aesthetic
questions that Tacitus picks up and elaborates in the Dialogus and
to which some brief further consideration is appropriate. Although
it has been persuasively argued that the Dialogus draws heavily upon
Quintilian's lost De Causis (Brink 1989), it is also a work that is
amenable to a more radical and political interpretation than is the
earlier work. At the very least, Tacitus is more explicit as to the
centrality of poetics to judgement, and so of politics-of
relationships, loves and the other affects of the intimate public
sphere-to the justice or injustice of laws and of their application.
In the Dialogus the theme is explicitly that of the character and
value of the practice of law. Rhetoric is here expressly the court
that will judge the practice of law and specifically address the charge
laid against the schools of legal rhetoric, namely that they were in
his day degenerate, ignorant and immoral "schools of
shamelessness" (ludum impudentiae). (Tacitus 1914 edn: 108) In other
words, if the legal institution is to be judged and professional
practice appraised, it cannot be by the profession itself but must
be from some point outside of the legal institution. It is for that
reason that the court is that of rhetoric-in modern terms one
would say scholarship-and judgement is given by the lawyer's
peers, the practitioners of the other branches of rhetoric, namely
the epideictic and deliberative genres, the practices of poetics and
politics.
The question of who is to judge is intimately linked to the quality
of judgement. Here it is not insignificant that the principal judge,
Maternus, a loosely masked representation of Tacitus himself, is
presented as a poet, an epideictic rhetorician, and that his criteria
of judgment are drawn in the main from his reasons for no longer
practising law. (Tacitus 1914 edn: 37) For Maternus, the yoke of
the practice of law, the acrimony, racket, hazard, greedy mania and
tears of the legal market-place held little charm when compared to
the tranquillity and recursive care of poetry: "Here is the cradle of
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eloquence, here is its holy of holies; this was the form and fashion
in which the faculty of utterance first won its way with mortal
men, steeming into hearts that were as yet pure and free of the
stain of guilt; poetry was the language of the oracles." (47) It is the
function of poetry, in this definition, to care for the soul and to
cultivate the spirit. Poetics, and by association literature, ar~ the
non-instrumental arts that ordain the purpose of institutional
existence and the criteria for valuing individual lives. 5 Devolving
from these poetic criteria, the rhetoricians determine that there are
two structural causes of the decline of legal oratory. First, there is
the separation of legal rhetoric from its basis in literature and
poetics. This is deemed to be both a failing of historical
understanding and an aesthetic lapse. In historical terms, following
Cicero, poetry is the original basis of community and institution, it
is the first law and poets are the first lawgivers. Poetry, in short,
precedes and underpins both the value and the practice of law and
it is to the peril of lawyers that they forget that genealogy or genesis.
(49-51) The poetic contract thus precedes the legal contract: to the
extent that law is the expression of social stability, it depends upon
the images of identity, the sentiments of community and the
practices of virtue that poetry instil.
The separation of law from literature is accompanied by a
correlative disjunction of theory and practice in the schools of
forensic rhetoric or what would now be termed the legal academy.
Granted the juridical view, both ancient and modern, that poetry
and literature are distinct from law precisely by virtue of the noninstrumental character of the aesthetic, its lack of direct impact
upon the polity or the real, it is ironic that Tacitus views the
separation of law and literature as a dimension of the estrangement
of the theory of legal rhetoric from practice or the public sphere.
To the extent, however, that poetry precedes both politics and law
it follows that the separation of legal rhetoric from poetics is a
separation of law from the practice, the life-style and values, in
short the embodiment that poetry represents. It was a practice

252

Rhetoric and Somatics

concerned, according to Maternus, with the inculcation of virtue
and with care of the soul and was in consequence intrinsic to the
polity or to the real in a much more tangible sense than the agonistic
and superfluous activities of legal orators who sought either venal
advantage or self-aggrandisement.
Drawing upon the criticisms of the corruption of speech, and
particularly the bond between ineloquence and injustice, Tacitus
places just speech in the domain of action: "For the real basis of
eloquence is not theoretical knowledge (cognoscam) only, but in a far
greater degree natural capacity and practical exercise." Slightly later,
and in a curiously contemporary tone, Tacitus affirms that "theory
(artibus) involves practice, and it is impossible for any one to grasp...
diverse and abstruse subjects, unless their theoretical knowledge is
re-enforced by practice ... " (103) In the political reading that Tacitus
gives to the causes of the corruption of eloquence, the truth of
law lies in its practice: the actors in the drama of law are eloquent
and so just only to the extent that their speech embodies the ethos,
the knowledges and the virtues, which ideally allow law to contribute
to the civility of the public sphere. To the extent that the lawyer as
actor intervenes in the polity, their speech is the form of their
practice, and that speech, to borrow this time from Cicero, "enacts
the real." (1982 edn: 3. 214)
Turning, finally, to the causes of the corruption of legal
eloquence, which is the explicit theme of the Dia/ogus, Tacitus
elaborates three complex sets of signs of juristic estrangement or
disaffection, three marks of injustice. The first sign is the increasing
separation of the lawyer from the real, which here means not simply
alienation from the public sphere of legal action, but equally a
disembodiment or emptying of the legal subject, an estrangement
from the poetic sources, the truths or fates which law expresses.
Adopting a version of Quintilian's analysis, the schools are berated
for debating themes such "the reward of the king-killer," "a remedy
for the plague," or the "incestuous mother," in that such themes
are remote from political reality and irrelevant to the causes that
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are pleaded in court. (facitus 1914 edn: 111) The estrangement of
the school from the real is also expressed in the self-estrangement
of the lawyer, in the collapse of the identity or personality of the
jurist to which later critics of law have so often returned. If
education in the rhetoric of law inculcates an abstruse and politically
irrelevant casuistry, an unreal and so unjust oratory, then the
estrangement of the legal institution from the life of the polity will
inevitably also be reflected in the narcissistic isolation of the
individual lawyer whose public persona is predicated upon having
nothing to say.
The decline of the law schools is not an autonomous event,
but is linked explicitly to the deterioration in the ethos and episteme
of legal practice. The second sign of the corruption of legal
eloquence lies in a species of stylistic and argumentative decay.
Legal language becomes divorced from the vernacular and
increasingly alien to the realities of everyday discourse. The
"bombastic style" (109) and "magniloquent phraseology" (111) of
the schools is a symptom of the divorce of legal language from
any significant or ethical role within the public sphere. Law becomes
a matter of hierophantic dictate or pontifical pronouncement rather
than being related in any direct manner to the lives, the languages,
or the values of those governed. In an argument that has been
revived repeatedly, Tacitus suggests that the ethics of law can be
measured by the language used by lawyers. More specifically, judged
by the traditional criteria of appropriateness of language to subjectmatter and to audience, the language of law was deemed obscure,
empty and largely self-referential. The language, in other words,
reflected the separation of law from its sources, and of legal practice
from the public sphere. By contrast, to borrow one of the more
famous formulations of the Dialogur. "Great oratory is like a flame:
it needs fuel to feed it, movement to fan it, and it brightens as it
burns." (111)
The failings of legal language reflect a degeneracy that is both
ethical and aesthetic. The final sign or criterion of the corruption
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of legal eloquence is aesthetic. In a surprising yet resonant argument,
Tacitus suggests that the decline of forensic oratory is expressed
in a style of dress that has become ridiculous, and in an architecture
that belittles the space and significance of legality. Of dress, Tacitus
.remarks: "take those gowns into which we squeeze ourselves when
addressing the court, the costume prevents all movement, and well
reflects the orator's loss of dignity and credibility." (119-21)
Allowing for a reading that acknowledges the vital role of the
aleatory and sumptuary in the governance of the body, and so too
in the inscription of the soul, the reference to the corporeal
constraint and absurdity of the legal toga is complex. (Goodrich
1998) What is lost initially is the corporeal freedom necessary to
the expression of ideas, to gesture and elocution, tone and style.
Already it is hard to imagine eloquence where the speaking subject
lacks the sartorial room to expand and expatiate. More than that,
however, the issue is explicitly also one of credence and dignity, of
justum and decorum. The loss of decorum is a loss of the poetry or
sensibility that attaches the persona of the lawyer to the ethos of
law. This collapse of the symbolic order, even where expressed in
signs as seemingly peripheral as dress, marks again the classical
sense in which the enactment of the real, the corporeal practice of
law, is the proper measure of both its eloquence and its justice.
Where law plays out the drama of public life upon a bare stage and
before an empty auditorium; where the agon of the courtroom
proceeds in "a scene of desolation" (121), without witness, purpose
or style, then the material impoverishment of law likely reflects a
much deeper corruption of speech.

The law of tears
In Christian doctrine, the discourse on tears was addressed primarily
to the proper forms of expression of mourning at the death of a
loved one. 6 The tears expended at funerals were to be restrained,
weeping was to be ordered and the various physiological signs of
penitence or loss were alike to be governed by doctrines of
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retention. The body, in other words, does not belong to the subject,
and cannot be given over to spontaneous lachrymose subversions.
The body and its desires were subjugated to law, and in Christian
doctrine that meant a law which perceived life as a wound and
death as metamorphosis rather than destruction of the body.
Spontaneous weeping thus signified a feminine dissolution of
reason in emotion, and in consequence it had a negative meaning,
tears were signs of meanness and of evil. To call out or supplicate
with tears was permissible only according to the specified forms
of the liturgy and in this instance the tears would be silent and
inter~al or 'mystical'. Ceremonial tears marked a joyous waiting
(langor mirabi/is) or even a purification of the body as part of the
rite of prayer, of pro petitione lacrymarnm.
That Abraham Fraunce alludes to the dogmatics of tears early
on in his criticism of the common law can be interpreted according
to the differing levels of meaning attributed to weeping. Most
immediately, and Tacitus too had made this observation, tears and
tear-stained faces were part of the reality of petition and cause.
Tears may here have marked the distance between poetry and law
but they also signified the hazards, dangers and corruptions of
legal practice. Tears in this sense had no part to play in the discourse
of law and indeed weeping was an illicit gesture or argument, an
affect and not a reason. While there can be no doubt that Fraunce's
reference to tears shed both amongst and in response to the
activities of the voces vena/es of the legal market-place is a criticism
of unnecessary or illogical weeping, it is also a criticism directed
most expressly at lawyers, at the "upstart rabulae farensel' (Fraunce
1588a: 4r) themselves. If we read Fraunce's discourse through the
rhetorical tradition that impugns the causes of the corruption of
eloquence, then the reference to tears and to the hi/aritas or
"dunsicality" (Sv) of lawyers are literal and explicit signs of
estrangement from the real. The tears here mark an epistemic loss
with a corporeal trace. Each term of that loss, both the jealousy
and the pain of law, can be sketched by way of the earlier discourse
on the corruption of legal eloquence.
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The specific context of Fraunce's critique of legal ineloquence
needs to be sketched in terms of the material contexts and physical
effects of the corruption of speech. Abraham Fraunce had moved
from Cambridge University to the Inns of Court, and Lincoln's
Inn specifically. He had moved from one place to another and
from one school to another. His critique of law is school based. It
is directed at the habits and practices, the methods and
performances, of the Inns of Court: "Men reason in schools as
philosophers, in Westminster as lawyers, in Court as lords, in country
as worldly husbands." (3v) As Walter Ong has observed, the
school-whether philosophical or legal-is defined by an
architecture of place, by the materiality and location of a practice.
(Ong 1958) Derived etymologically from scho/a, meaning among
other things classroom or place of learned conversation, the school
is first of all a site of interaction, the material location or geography
of a practice. Fraunce acknowledges this most explicitly through
his metonymies of place: schoolroom for philosopher, Westminster
for lawyer, Court for nobility and Inn of Court for the training of
the body to do the work of law.
The location of method and critique within an architecture and
the other materialities of a practice, is also a mechanism for locating
thought in the context of the embodiment of practice. Place
connotes materiality and corporeality and hence provides the
precondition for what Cicero and following him Fraunce termed
veritas, the practice of law as the enactment of the real. Fraunce
makes this connotation or connection explicit in going on to discuss
the virtue of schools, and in particular that of the Inns of Court,
in terms of their teaching of the "force" and the "consequence"
of arguments. (7v-8r) Logic, and specifically the logic of law, was
taught in schools and taught so as to train the student in the pragmata,
in the effects of rhetoric, in the force of argument, in the
performance of justice as enactment of the real.
Training in law was a training in logic and rhetoric, a training in
the emotional force and so also the physical effects of words. The
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practice of rhetoric was not only defined by place-by the ambient
location of the body-it was also defined by its relation to its
auditory subjects, by the effect of the word upon its recipients.
Consider again Fraunce's discussion of arrest, and here arrest in
the context of the common law of treason: "If.. . a man calls
another traitor, and he says noth;ng to this, he is by due process of
law arrested for suspicion, and for this must answer to the
accusation." (45r) Words can order, uplift and entreat, but they can
also wound, arrest, or condemn. In each case, words inhabit a place
and a relationship, a theatre of enactment or performance that
leads Fraunce to opine significantly that "I will never think him
worthy of the title and name logician, that never puts his general
contemplation into particular practice .. . " (115r) The meaning of
words, and the meaning of laws, lay in speech acts that incorporated
both word and gesture, speech and context. The lawyer was
necessarily engaged in a rhetorical performance, in the theatre of
the real.
Returning to the tears that mark the injustice of laws, their
most immediate textual cause, for Fraunce, lies in the dispute
between law and scholarship. It is here, drawing explicitly upon the
classical antagonism between law and poetry, that Fraunce accounts
the good scholar to be both a poet and orator. Scholarship here
has both explicitly and tacitly a basis in poetics, and in terms
reminiscent of Maternus' defence of poetry, Fraunce speaks of
the "easy, elegant, conceited, nice and delicate learning" of the
poet and of the skill that goes into the writing of verse. Poetrythe "new found verses of Amyntas death" (2r)-and more
practically the lyric affinities or "likeness of signs" that allow
Plowden to remark "semblable reason, semblable ley" (73r) are
unquestionably for Fraunce the greater or first source of law. In
Ciceronian terms the poetic is the domain of invention and it is
joined to law in the most practical of forms, namely that of method
which joins rhetoric to logic and allows thereby both for "a more
easy and elegant kind of disputation" and also for philosophical
elaboration. (120r)
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The polemical object of the Lawiers Logike is proclaimed early
on to be that of bringing scholarship to law, and law to scholarship.
(7r) Logic and law, in the words of the dedicatory poem, should
become "nearest and dearest friends." In this argument, friendship
belongs within the intimate public domain of the poetic, and
scholarship itself is a secondary expression of sources grounded
in the lyric of nature or law of love and transmitted by means of
the universitas of philosophical friendships and their kindred texts. 7
It is important to recognise that the scholar is much more than
simply a logician, and that method is in essence a formal enterprise
or mode of disposition and presentation. The "university man" to
whom Fraunce refers at length is someone who will bring to law
the fruit of ten years of study and the wisdom of the disciplines
and modes of inscription that should in the argument of the Lawiers
Logike precede and revitalise the law. The figure of friendship is
thus juxtaposed polemically to that of the unlearned, "dunsical,"
silly, confused and asinine. Again following the trajectory of the
causes of the corruption of legal eloquence, it is possible to sketch
Fraunce's contemporary exposition of the licence and ignorance,
the /icentia and inscita, or even the /uxuria and ignorantia, that mark
the body of law.
At the risk of a certain reverse causality, the immediate context
of Fraunce's criticism refers to "that hotchpotch French, stuffed
up such with variety of borrowed words, wherein our law is
written." 8 (3r-v) It is the language of law that is in the first instance
the cause of its "hard, harsh, unpleasant, unsavoury, rude and
barbarous" (3r) character as an object-language of professional
study. While the most profound reason given for the failings of
language are the lawyer's resistance to university learning-to
scholarship-and most particularly to the Ramistic concept of
method, the corruption of legal eloquence and here the loss of
e/egantia iuris lies rather in the failings of forensic rhetoric. Rhetoric
must be tied to truth, indeed if it is to be eloquent and so just it
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must enact the real. The real in its turn is the product of lengthy
learning and subtle technique and it requires at a minimum a deep
sense of the meaning and use of words. Here the poetic must be
structured in a specific order or form: "fitly and according to cause,
auditors, time, place and such like circumstances." (115r) Such is
the charge of law, but it is one that requires first a sensibility to~ards
words and their representation of the truth of things: "for words
be notes of things, and of all words either derivative or compound,
you may yield some reason set forth from the first arguments, if
the notation be well made. [Etymology or notation] is called originatio,
quod originem verborum explicet: et Erymologia, id est, veroloquium." (5 lr)
The poetic truth of a word, as also the rhetorical force and
significance of its use, depend upon a properly scholarly
apprehension of its source or root in the domain of the originary.
That the notion of the thing gains expression in the notation of
the word is a common theme of humanist sensibility and one which
Fraunce seeks tirelessly to propound "contrary to the prejudiced
opinion of some silly penmen, and illogical lawyers, who think it a
fruitless point of superfluous curiosity to understand the words
of a man's own profession." (56v) If we follow the contrary or
opposite set out in this argument, then the ignorance and the licence
of the legal profession is marked more than anything else by a
scholarly failure to understand words, and particularly the words
of the law. The failing is both poetic and logical and so Fraunce is
here again close to the classical topic or common place of the
corruption of eloquence. The injustice of law is most expressly a
failure to speak justly, a corruption of the relation of the lawyer to
the real by virtue of their misapprehension of signs.
The argument made by Fraunce as to the corruption of
eloquence gains its most vivid expression in his polemic against
contemporary lawyers. Again using a figurative language that first
marks injustice as stylistic or oratorical infelicity, Fraunce directs
his criticisms against "babblers" (57r), "seditious cavillers" (7r),
"grand little mootmen" (89v), " silly penmen" and other
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"singlesowld lawyers and golden asses" (62r) who practice an
unlearned profession and "after some lewd bargain in the country,
run immediately to the Inns of Court, and having in seven years
space met with six French words, home they ride like brave
magnificoes, and dash their poor neighbours children quite out of
countenance, with villen in gros, villen regardant, and Tenan_t per
curtesie." (7v-8r) The legal orator "[does) obscure things purposely;
amplify; digress; flatter; insinuate; alter; change; and turn all upside
down" (114r), placing first things last, and last things first. In this
manner, "the greedy desire of a superficial show in unnecessary
trifles makes us want the true substance" (62r) of common law.
What is at stake in the corruption of legal eloquence is not
simply a question of poor logic or of deficient style. In summing
up his critique of common law, Fraunce explicitly links reform of
legal method to ease of government, and felicity of expression or
elegantia iuris to good order and felicity. (120r) He continues: "To
conclude I could heartily wish the whole body of our law to be
rather logically ordered, than by alphabetical breviarum torn and
dismembered ... " (119v) To grasp the significance of this
conclusion it needs to be place in its Renaissance context. The
body of law was not an abstraction or estranged figure of speech,
it was a metonymy, and specifically a prosopopoiea or face of both
place and people, of the habits, customs, and other enactments of
common law. The body of the law was conceived as a real body, a
terrain or territory that Fraunce next speaks of in terms of English
habit and national competence or jurisdiction. The body of law
was very explicitly the body of the nation. It was what Fraunce's
contemporary, the antiquarian scholar William Camd~n termed the
chorograpf?y, the pattern or dance of a people living together over
time. (Camden 1586) Lawyers and the common law were the
emblems of this national body or habitually trained local realm.
The body of the law was corpus mysticum or pax regem, but it was also
and more interestingly a moveable body, the mark or geography of
practice over time.

261

Goodrich

In the same vein, to tear or dismember the laws was to tear and
dismember the patterns and interactions, the physical life and
material practices of the Anglican dance, of the choreography that
is English law. To tear the realm up was thus to tear people apart,
to dismember subjects, to pull apart the members of the realm,
the space and time and movement of England. And hence the
tears, because ineloquence led to inelegant practices, and these in
turn led to the inexorable decay, the slow dismemberment of the
nation hersel£ All this, in other words, was for the want of words,
for the lack of eloquence, for the loss of poetic and rhetorical
skills.
The "ungentle legists" (Ferne 1586: 93) that Fraunce impugns
are unjust because they are ineloquent, they fail to speak justly and
so omit to do justice in practice. Without expanding further upon
this already well-rehearsed Ciceronian theme it should be noted
that the principal political thesis advanced by Fraunce is one which
seeks to restore ease, elegance and civility to the polity in the most
immediate and physical or embodied of senses. The cause is both
stylistically and substantially poetic and seeks to introduce a different
truth or bond between words and things, and so too between
rhetoric and judgement, between law and justice. The corruption
of eloquence is the means through which the critic reads the
disorder, confusion, indigestion and dismemberment of the
substantive discipline, of the school and its practice. The failing of
the unlearned and ineloquent lawyer is that of incivility. It is a
political and rhetorical failing that enacts unpleasantness, harshness
and loss of wealth and countenance. The lawyer has come adrift
from the real through estrangement from the disciplines: the neglect
of rhetoric, of the discipline of speaking well, transpires thus to
be both a failure to care for the soul and a source of tears and
lamentation, pain and loss, in the polity. The tears shed by virtue
of the jealousy or inappropriate autonomy of law are real tears
and mark indelibly the quality of civil life as it is inhabited, as it is
embodied and lived.
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Legal Somatics
This essay has marked an historical and rhetorical trajectory around
the figures of eloquence and the justice of the legal enactment of
the real. The object of that trajectory has been the social body of
law as expressed through the corporeal figure and the names of
the lawyer. Its concern, to borrow a phrase, has been "the most
delicate, the most fragile and the most representative element of
the constitution of the social: the intimate relation which ties the
phenomenon of the institution to the problematic of speech."
(Legendre 1997: xiii) In the classical tradition of the causes of the
corruption of eloquence that intimate relation was spelled out not
only in terms of the necessary injustice of ineloquence, but also
by way of a theory of the real as the site of an embodiment of
justice in the practice of speech. If we turn finally to Fraunce's
theory of the epistemic that the forensic orator would ideally
inscribe, it is possible also to return to the theme of the body, both
as metaphor and substance, in the work of law.
There is, of course, a common theme in the curricula rhetorical
manuals used at the Inns of Court that stresses physical moderation
of diet, exercise, routine and continence as important aspects of
learning the law, of memory and comprehension, and Fraunce relays
some of that knowledge.9 While there is a certain poetic logic to
the alimentary regulation of lawyers and to the ascetic and even
melancholy physical regime recommended for students of law, it is
no more than symptomatic of a broader theme which I will term
legal somatics. Here we return to the earlier problematic of the
inscription of law through the arrest of the body and, as Lambard
puts it, the subjection of the person to the will of the law. It is here
that Fraunce can be used not simply as a latter day instance of the
tradition inaugurated in the De Causis, but also as the harbinger of
a more novel reading of the legal institution: where law does not
arrest, constrain or stop the person of the subject it must act in a
more symbolic and repeated form. If arrest is not the usual course
of enacting the law, that is because the normal mode of legal
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inscription is directed to the unconscious or habitual body of the
subject, to the somatics of repetition and the traces that it leaves.
The question of the incorporation of law in what Blackstone
later coined as the silent or tacit consent of the subject, in custom
and use, is played out by Fraunce in a more radical epistemic form.
In an important discussion of "borrowed arguments," Fraunce
addresses the role of arguments from the authority of precedent
in the unravelling of common law. Citing Plato, he makes the
subversive argument that those who use the authority of others
instead of arguments of their own "are fools ... [for] in these
borrowed testimonies there is no reason or persuasion, but rather
violence and compulsion." (1588a: 66v-67r) The borrowed
argument is not a symbol of thought but rather the collapse of a
symbol, and the most unjust of failures to enact the real. This
form of repetition, this unthought by means of which the legal
orator represents the will of the law, is not only a hermeneutic
violence but equally a corporeal failing, a swollen emptiness that
returns to haunt the body and scar the polity.
Somewhat later the borrowed argument is again taken up and
discussed in explicitly somatic terms. Under the methodical rubric
of the exclusion of false and lame precepts, authorities without
dignity, Fraunce remarks that if such a goal-pnma r~ufa.-could
be achieved then "all repugnant dreams of serjeants and councellors
that serve the time and speak for money should not run so current
for good law: nay every judgment given either without reason, or
with partiality, should not stand for justice: every semble, should
not pass for a sentence, nor every dictum fuit, for a dictators
constitution." (89r) The unreflectively repeated dreams of the
serjeants of coif and of law could not be paraded as having the
dignity of reason or the force of law. Again it is noteworthy that
injustice is correlated to verbal acts, to bad sentences-dictum and
dictate--and that these failures to enact the real of law are depicted
as the work of a sleeping body, of a lethargic and indifferent
constitution.
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The problematic to which this criticism belongs is one which
lies on the border of corporal and spiritual, at the juncture of
dignity and rationality, of image and rule. One further example can
make the point more directly. In a discussion of argumentative
digressions, Fraunce remarks that impertinent digression "or rather
repugnant imaginations continually cast in, mar all." (119r) With
the reversion to imagination, which is also termed bad memory
and disordered argument, we return to the poetic as the source of
reason and the ethos that underpins law. To train the body to do
the work of law is an ethical undertaking that is inevitably thwarted
by the violence of brute precedent or the compulsion of
unreasoned authority. To enact and so embody the truth of law in
Ciceronian terms meant to act in accordance with the ethos and
dictates of a higher law, a lex legum that was inscribed not in texts
or positive judgements, but invisibly and creatively in the heart. All
of which is to say that enacting the phantasmatically known laws
of nature, kind and love, requires the inscription first of the
rhetorical techniques of embodiment, an ease and openness of
attitude and tone. The work of law is thus a work of transmission
that exists on the fragile border across which the corporeal accedes
to the spiritual and the imagination is formed.
The last word belongs in this instance not to Fraunce but to his
contemporary, lawyer and poet, George Puttenham. In his famous
defence of 'English poesie', Puttenham addresses the decline in
respect for poetry and poets. His contemporaries, he complains,
hold the poet in disdain and call him "a light headed or phantasticall
man." (1589: 14) To this disregard of the poetic, Puttenham
counterposes the properly epistemic view that "the phantasticall
part of man represents the best, the most comely and beautiful
images or appearances of things, to the soul." 10 He continues in
the following vein: "such persons as be illuminated by the brightest
irradiations of knowledge and of the verity of due proportion of
things, they are called by the learned not phantastics but
euphantasiste, and of this sort of phantasies are all good poets...
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all legislators, politicians and counsellors ... " (1589: 15) Here, finally,
in the antique concept of euphantasy we are returned or at least
reminded not only of the stakes of eloquence but also of the
conjunction of the somatic and the legal. The reference to
euphantasy is a reference to the lyric, to rhythm and speech, song
and law. The poetic in this sense is directly a training of the body
or, in the words of the Art de dictier, it is a reference to music, to
"the last science, which is to be understood as the medicine of the
arts, because the courage and spirit of those engaged in the other
arts are tired and bored from their labours." (Deschamps 1392: 269)
The lawyer, in Fraunce's account, is quintessentially tired and
bored by the rigours of their labour. The ineloquence or corruption
of legal speech thus reflects a melancholic langour, a weariness of
spirit and lassitude in the performance of the tasks of law. The
remedy is rhythm and a return to the dance of law. The rhetoric of
law is thus taken to be the site of a reversal of conventional juridical
expectations. That the poetic and lyric should be seen to take
precedence over the somatic techniques of rote learning and its
venal imaginings is but one meaning of the rhetorical figure of the
euphantasist lawyer. The other and broader sense of euphantasy is
in Fraunce's words an escape from the violence of legal textuality
and the compulsion or somatics of interpretation. Here again the
stake is the dignity and eloquence of law: to train the body to do
the work of law is to seek through scholarship and pedagogy to
align the text of law with the eloquence of the disciplines that
address the care of the soul, or in classical terms with nature. The
body is the site of such an alignment or euphantasy and it is only
in the corporeal, in the embodiment of law in speech, that the
memories and the friendships of which Fraunce wrote can come
in turn to eloquent expression.

Notes
1

In a mildly Kafkaesque twist, it transpires that Fraunce sees the
temporality of arrest as deriving from the requirement that the person
arrested be brought "before the law." The law Latin for arrest is either
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2

3

4

5

6

7

capias or attachias, to which Fraunce adds that "our precept notes it by
the words duci facias, cause him to be conveyed ... for that the officer
hath after a sort, taken him before ... some justice of the peace."(64r)
This point can also be made in etymological terms: dogma and
decorum have common roots and can be interpreted to imply a
dimension of dream in the the unravelling of thought. See Legendre
(1986) and the commentary in Goodrich (1990). The concept of
dogma or in this instance of legal dogmatics, carries with it a sense of
the imaginings and fantasies that constitute social identity and govern
the relationships of the public domain. The later tradition distinguished
honestum,justum and decorum as the three spheres of public action, with
inevitably indistinct or labile boundaries.
The definition comes from the Digest but is to be found in Fraunce
and in other contemporaries. See, for example, Sir John Doderidge,
The English La11:)1er (1631: 28): "knowledge of the law is affirmed to be
rerum divinarum humanarumque scientid', by which he also affirms that it
"comprises all other knowledges" and is "the science of sciences." To
divagate slightly, Fraunce (1588c: Bk 1), in his work on symbols also
follows the convention of .rymbola heroica in noting the relation between
visual sign and that which is signified, between mark and dignity, as
also between body and soul.
Cicero (1923 ed.: xii. 30) remarks: "Many great men have been studious
to leave behind them statues and portraits (imagines), likenesses not of
the soul, but of the body; and how much more anxious should we be
to bequeath an effigy of our minds and characters, wrought and
elaborated by supreme talents?"
For a recent and, in my view, at times complacent version of this
argument, see Nussbaum (1995) . James Boyd-White (1990) and
Richard Weisberg (1992) offer versions of this argument in proposing
rhetoric as the criterion for evaluating legal judgment.
I discuss the Renaissance discourse on mourning, in Goodrich. (1995:
16-22) The other crucial discussion is to be found in Legendre. (1997:
48-54)
Without embarking upon any extended analysis of philosophical
friendship, it is clear that in Renaissance terms there was a considerable
weight of affinity, even eros, to the citation and circulation of classic
and contemporary texts. The disposition towards disputation allowed
not only the antirrhetic affect of polemic against opponents but also
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the emotional exposition and naming of the desired texts and loved
names. Fraunce is particularly prone to this discourse of textual
friendship and to matching the laudation of friends-Plato, Aristotle,
Cicero particularly amongst the ancients, and Valla, Hotman and Ramus
amongst contemporaries. To take one example from Fraunce (1588a:
67r): ''.Amicus Socrates, amicus Plato, magis amica veritas."
8 My analysis will avoid repeating the general description of Frawice's
critique of lawyers which is rehearsed at length in "A Short History of
Failure: Law and Criticism 1560-1620" in Goodrich (1990). There is
also the excellent brief discussion in Dzialo (1998).
9 Fraunce (1588a: 117) for instance discusses memory in the standard
terms of the "comfortable simples" and "orderly diet, exercise ..." and
the like. For discussion of this theme, see "Eating Law: Commons,
Common Land, Common Law" in Goodrich (1996) .
10 The ability to appreciate the epistemological value of phantasms is a
matter both of method and of mood. The moderns are blind, in
Puttenham's view, and he proceeds to talk of "these gross heads, not
being brought up or acquainted with any excellent art, nor able to
contrive, or in manner conceive any matter of subtlety in any business
or science do deride and scorn it in all others . . . and whatever devise
be of rare invention they term phantasticall." The relation between
phantasm and rhetorical invention is captured in the maxim animam
non intel/igere absque phantasmal-the soul could not understand without
phantasms. (1589: 14)
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